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 Are prison conditions a subject of relevance to the transnational legal ordering of criminal 
justice? The concept of transnational legal ordering is a fresh way of understanding the complex 
interactions between international law and the international and regional institutions that have a 
real impact on not only legal rules but also social reality at the national level.1  
The question of whether prison conditions are influenced by transnational legal ordering 
presents a particular challenge. While it is clear that in some specific criminal justice areas, such as 
money laundering, human trafficking, or drug trade across borders, national legal frameworks are 
shaped directly by international instruments, it is not obvious that prison conditions are influenced 
by forces beyond national borders. If it can be demonstrated that prison conditions are subject to 
transnational legal ordering, this will be an important contribution to understanding transnational 
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legal orders in general, as the practical implementation of prison sentences has not previously been 
studied from this perspective.        
The elements of “legal,” “ordering,” and “transnational” all have to be present for a topic 
to be relevant to this form of analysis. The answer to the primary question begins by first 
considering briefly whether prison conditions are subject to law and are therefore “legal.” 
Secondly, one must decide whether prison conditions are subject to a process of “ordering,” which 
results in their developing a particular way. Thirdly, one must evaluate any process of legal ordering 
to which prison conditions may be subject in order to determine whether it is really 
“transnational.”  
Studying transnational legal orders closely is not only a matter of deciding whether a 
particular area of study, in this case prison conditions, constitutes such an order. It is also a matter 
of observing what impact transnational legal ordering of the particular area of study has. 
Ultimately, the value of this approach depends on insights into how transnational ordering impacts 
on national penal systems, and whether it explains developments that can only be understood if 
their transnational dimensions are made explicit.  
Before considering these issues directly, one should observe that virtually every nation state 
in the modern world has at least one prison. The universal relevance of prisons to modern criminal 
justice is obvious. At their core, prisons are institutions where individuals are held against their 
will, either because they are alleged to have committed a criminal offense, or because they have 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment as a punishment resulting from their having been found 
to have committed a criminal offense.2 The principle of the use of imprisonment for purposes of 
crime prevention and punishment is not seriously challenged. In that sense, abolitionist 
movements notwithstanding, prisons worldwide enjoy a great deal of legitimacy.   
 In each modern nation state, there is law governing the external and internal aspects of 
imprisonment. Legal rules govern respectively, both who should be admitted to or released from 
prison (external), and how they should be treated while they are in prison (internal). Internal and 
external aspects of imprisonment are closely related, for the internal regime determines not only 
the day-to-day running of the prison but also whether prisoners are offered opportunities for self-
improvement, which will influence decisions about their release.3 Prison conditions are therefore 
dependent on both the internal and external aspects of imprisonment. Both are subjects of a 
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national legal order, in that in all modern states they are governed by law, both statutory and as 
developed in the jurisprudence of the national courts.   
 In almost all countries, this law is underpinned by a national or, in federal countries, a 
state-based prison bureaucracy that operates within the wider administrative structures of the 
nation state to normalize the notion of a state prison system. It seems, therefore, to be beyond 
dispute that prisons and the conditions that pertain in them are part of a legal order. Whether the 
legal order governing imprisonment extends beyond the national, however, is open to dispute.  
  Does the ubiquity of imprisonment make the legal rules governing it into elements of a 
transnational legal order? Clearly not automatically or necessarily. It is possible that the law 
governing each country’s national prison system developed quite independently of international 
standards? Common basic standards could emerge independently in each legal order. National 
prison systems could operate quite independently of any constraints other than those of the 
national legal and bureaucratic frameworks.   
 Notwithstanding the possibility that prison conditions are an entirely national question, 
this Paper argues that there is evidence that modern prison law, including the part of it that governs 
prison conditions, has a key transnational component. Moreover, it seeks to demonstrate that the 
way in which transnational prison law impacts on national prison systems is evidence of the 
emergence of a legal ordering of prison conditions that is specifically transnational.  
 The substance of this Paper divides into three parts. The first part begins by examining the 
legal standards governing prison conditions that have emerged at the international and regional 
levels. It is necessary to establish their existence and legal scope before considering how, 
increasingly, they have gained legitimacy. The second part describes how these standards are 
applied in a way that contributes to a recognizable international legal order in respect of prison 
conditions, which has real impact at the national level. In the third part, close attention is paid to 
the transfer of prisoners between states, as a mechanism that operates transnationally and, in the 
process, enhances the importance of international prison standards. The conclusion returns to the 
primary questions about the impact of transnational legal ordering and what it reveals about 
transnational legal order as a conceptual framework for understanding the evolution of prison 
conditions. 
 
I. EMERGENCE  
 Rudimentary forms of imprisonment have existed ever since people developed the 
technical skills to build securely enough to incarcerate others. However, only from the 
Enlightenment onwards, were movements for improving prison conditions routinely accompanied 
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by legal reforms. In England, for example, exposure of the vile prison conditions common in the 
late-eighteenth century by the great prison reformer, John Howard, was followed by legislation.4 
Initially, the legislation did not deal directly with prison conditions. Instead, it concentrated on 
creating a national institutional order, which would fix the disorder in the prisons of the old system 
and in the process improve prison conditions. Revisionist historians of punishment, as different 
as Michel Foucault and Michael Ignatieff, have noted the impact of these changes. The new order, 
in Ignatieff’s words, “substituted the rule of rules for the rule of custom” with profound 
consequences for the way order was maintained in prisons and for the way in which prisoners 
interacted with the prison authorities.5  
 The gradual systemization of imprisonment by national law did not bring an end to 
concerns about prison conditions. On the contrary, these concerns remained, and, from a very 
early stage, they transcended national boundaries. This is epitomized in the life of John Howard 
who, from his English base, broadened his work to include the rest of the United Kingdom (UK) 
and, subsequently, large areas of the European continent.6 Indeed, on his last prison visit, which 
took him as far as modern-day Ukraine, Howard died of an illness contracted while visiting a 
prison.7  
 A similar reformist tendency, which combined concern with prison conditions with the 
crystallization of prison law, emerged throughout Europe as ideas on prison policies were widely 
shared. In the course of the nineteenth century, as the prison historian, Patricia O’Brien, has noted:   
 
Each European nation formed and maintained its own prison system. In spite of 
distinct, national institutions, however, the prison systems that developed 
throughout Europe in the nineteenth century were remarkably similar, reflecting a 
commonly held penal philosophy. Shared ideas about how to create prisons that 
were secure, sanitary, and rehabilitative produced similar prison populations, 
architecture, work systems, and inmate subcultures.8  
  
Shared ideas about what prison conditions should ideally be like were internationalized at 
a surprisingly early stage. Americans visited European prisons to see the newest prisons that had 
                                                 
4 GAOLS ACT, 1791: 31 Geo.III, c.46. For details of this and subsequent English legislation, see LIVINGSTONE, 
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AN ACCOUNT OF SOME FOREIGN PRISONS 78 (W.J. Forsythe ed., 2000) (1792). 
7 DAVID WILSON, PAIN AND RETRIBUTION: A SHORT HISTORY OF BRITISH PRISONS, 1066 TO THE PRESENT, at 36 
(2014). 
8 Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent Europe 1865–1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON,  at 
178–201 (Norval Morris & David Rothman eds., 1995).  
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been praised by John Howard. Traffic in the opposite direction was even more pronounced. The 
most famous transatlantic visitor to the US of this period was Alexandre de Tocqueville who was 
sent by the French government to study US prisons in 1831 and who came back with sharp insights 
about the latest prison regimes. Delegations from the British and Prussian governments followed 
in his footsteps.9    
 The early International Penitentiary Congresses, first held in Frankfurt in 1846 and 
Brussels in 1847, attracted expert delegates—scholars and practitioners—from throughout what 
was then known as the civilized world. These congresses played an influential role well into the 
early twentieth century. They adopted solemn resolutions, describing the emerging international 
consensus on the conditions under which prisoners should be held and the “rehabilitative” regimes 
with which they should best be treated.10   The idea that there should be international prison 
standards had its roots in these transnational scientific conferences, as their resolutions were to be 
reflected in future international standards on prison conditions  
 
A. The emergence of international legal standards on prison conditions 
 
 After the First World War the focus gradually shifted to the development of standards that 
would have the imprimatur of an international organization. In 1926, the International Penological 
and Penitentiary Council (IPPC), in some ways the successor body to the earlier international 
penitentiary congresses, and consisting of a mixture of governmental and independent expert 
members, began drafting a set of standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners.11 In 1934, 
the IPPC draft received the endorsement of the League of Nations.12 However, the League of 
Nations was a relatively weak international organization. Moreover, the rise of fascism not only 
disrupted the system of international conferences but also contributed strongly to the demise of 
the League of Nations as a body that could lend much legitimacy to international standards on 
prison conditions. 
                                                 
9 DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & SONJA SNACKEN, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRISON LAW AND POLICY: PENOLOGY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).  
10 Chris Leonards & Nico Randeraad, Transnational Experts in Social Reform, 1840–80, 55 INT’L REV. OF SOCIAL 
HISTORY 215, 238–39 (2010); Chris Leonards, Visitors to the International Penitentiary Congress: A 
Transnational Platform Dealing with Penitentiary Care, 26 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFTEN, 2015, at 80, 83 (Austria).  
11 LEON RADZINOWICZ, ADVENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY 364 (1999). 
12  William Clifford, The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 66 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 
PROCEEDINGS 232, 233 (1972). 
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 The growing worldwide recognition of human rights in the post-second world war period, 
as reflected initially in the establishment of the United Nations and its adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), provided a more secure anchor for international standard-
setting on prison conditions.13 The recognition of a general right to human dignity, together with 
the prohibition not only of torture but also of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in Article 5 of the UDHR, was of obvious relevance to prison conditions, for it 
provided a basis for specifying which conditions were unacceptable and therefore potentially in 
conflict with this prohibition.  
 Prison conditions were also the first criminal justice issue that the United Nations 
addressed when it came to setting international standards.  Earlier developments had provided it 
with a useful head start in this regard: there was already an established body of knowledge, 
legitimated by international experts, on what prison conditions such standards should support. 
Equally important was that a dialogue had begun between the purveyors of penological expertise 
and the makers of international law. The initial link between the IPPC and the League of Nations 
provided a foundation for this dialogue on which the United Nations could build by providing a 
forum for its continuation. This forum was provided by the First United Nations Congress on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Geneva in 1955 which allowed for a further mixture of 
official and “expert” knowledge,14 and at which UN member states could assent to the first 
international set of standards that governed prison conditions in any detail, the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (UNSMR). After the Congress, the 
UNSMR were given the further imprimatur of the UN Economic and Social Council in 1957. 15   
 A notable feature of the UNSMR was that its legal status was initially very limited. The 
Rules themselves have an almost apologetic tone. The preliminary comments to the 1955 UNSMR 
indicated that they were: 
 
not intended to describe in detail a model system of penal institutions. They seek 
only, on the basis of the general consensus of contemporary thought and the 
essential elements of the most adequate systems of today, to set out what is 
generally accepted as being good principle and practice in the treatment of prisoners 
and the management of institutions. 
 
                                                 
13 Dirk van Zyl Smit, Punishment & Human Rights, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 395, 
414 (Jonathan Simonds & Richard Sparks eds., 2013). 
14 RADZINOWICZ supra note 11, at 390. 
15  ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM 134, 135 
(1994). 
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This is not the wording of a binding treaty. International lawyers of the time would have 
had no difficulty in describing the UNSMR as an instrument stating the softest of soft law, a self-
limiting reassurance that undoubtedly initially made it easier for diverse states to accede to it. 
Gradually, however, the legal standing of the UNSMR increased. In 1970, the quinquennial UN 
Crime Congress commented on the “moral authority and hence the relatively mandatory nature” 
of the UNSMR and asked for the Rules to be reinforced in a resolution of the UN General 
Assembly, which duly obliged in 1971.16 
Another reason for the increasing status of the UNSMR was that, at both the international 
and regional levels, provisions relating to the human dignity of prisoners and the primary 
prohibitions on torture and on inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment were increasingly 
incorporated into binding treaties. At the international level, the most important provisions were 
the requirements of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that 
all persons deprived of their liberty should be treated with humanity and respect for their human 
dignity, and that cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment were prohibited.17 The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), which was charged with interpreting the provisions of the 
ICCPR, began regularly to make use of the UNSMR when applying the ICCPR to prison 
conditions. In the process, specific rules of the UNSMR were given increased legal status. By 1987 
Nigel Rodley was able to quote several references by the HRC to rules in the UNSMR pertaining 
to diverse prison conditions ranging from cell size to use of dark cells and handcuffs as 
punishment, which the HRC now regard as embodying direct legal obligations of states.18  
 The increase in the legal status of the UNSMR, however, was uneven. In the first sixty 
years after their initial adoption the 1955 UNSMR were subject to only one relatively minor 
amendment—in 1979—and for a long time there was considerable resistance to updating these 
rules, lest they be given even more weight. However, the United Nations reinforced the UNSMR 
by adopting additional instruments that collectively supported the process of hardening what had 
initially been regarded as a soft law instrument. These included the 1985 UN Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules),19 the 1988 UN Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,20 the 
1990 UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles deprived of their Liberty (the Havana Rules),21 the 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 10 and 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
18 NIGEL RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 222–32 (1987). 
19 Adopted by G.A. Res. 40/33, (Nov. 29, 1985).   
20 Adopted by G.A. Res. 43/173, (Dec. 9, 1988).  
21 Adopted by G.A. Res. 45/113, (Dec. 14, 1990). 
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1990 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines),22 the 
2007 Istanbul statement on the use and effects of solitary confinement,23 and the 2010 UN Rules 
for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Sanctions for Women Offenders (the 
Bangkok Rules).24 
 Of these, the Bangkok Rules have been particularly important in the process of upgrading 
the international requirements for prisons. The individual provisions of the Bangkok Rules 
systematically referred back to the UNSMR and in the process indicated the detailed developments 
that would create prison conditions suitable for women prisoners in the twenty-first century. The 
Bangkok Rules may have been relatively easy to accept, for they drew on the legitimacy that the 
development of women’s rights has accumulated in modern international human rights law: no 
state would want to be seen to oppose them and thus appear to be against women’s rights.25 
However, the Bangkok Rules were undoubtedly also significant as a practical indication that 
development of the UNSMR was possible within the UN framework. International non-
governmental organizations, such as Penal Reform International, used this momentum to press 
for reform of the UNSMR.26 
 Eventually in 2015, with significant support from the US, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a revised and updated version of the UNSMR, officially also to be known as the Nelson 
Mandela Rules. When adopting the Nelson Mandela Rules, the General Assembly observed that 
the Rules sought, “on the basis of the general consensus of contemporary thought and the essential 
elements of the most adequate systems of today, to set out what is generally accepted as being 
good principles and practice in the treatment of inmates and prison management.”27  
 At the international level, a firm seal of approval was quickly placed on the revised 
UNSMR. Since 2015, the HRC has quoted them with strong approval in at least six instances.28 
                                                 
22 Adopted by G.A. Res. 45/112, (Dec. 14, 1990).  
23 Adopted by a working group of 24 international experts on Dec. 9, 2007, it was annexed to the interim report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Manfred Nowak, of July 28, 2008. The Special Rapporteur considered it “a useful tool to promote the respect and 
protection of the rights of detainees.” 
24 Adopted by G.A. Res. 65/229, (Dec. 21, 2010). 
25 SUSAN TIEFENBRUN, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS (2012). 
26 Dirk van Zyl Smit, Legitimacy & the Development of International Standards for Punishment, in LEGITIMACY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 267, 292 (Justice Tankebe & Alison Liebling eds., 2013). 
27 G.A. Res. 70/175, annex, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) (Dec. 17, 2015). 
28 Mukhtar v. Kazakhstan, CCPR/C/115/D/2304/2013, Communication No. 2304/2013 (Dec. 9, 2015); Askarov 
v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the 
Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2231/2012 (May. 11, 2016); Matyakubov v. Turkmenistan 
CCPR/C/117/D/2224/2012, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the 
Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2224/2012 (Sep. 26, 2016); Uchetov v. Turkmenistan, 
CCPR/C/117/D/2226/2012, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, 
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The recent language of the HRC has often been peremptory. Thus, for example, in two of these 
cases, one in 2016 and one 2017,  which turned on the adequacy of medical treatment for prisoners, 
the HRC commented pointedly and in identical words that the state party to the ICCPR was 
“under an obligation to observe certain minimum standards of detention, which include the 
provision of medical care and treatment for sick prisoners, in accordance with Rule 24 of the 
Nelson Mandela Rules but that it had failed to do so.”29  
 Other international developments have also contributed to the emergence of international 
legal standards on prison conditions. Prominent amongst these is the increasing role played by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with regard to prisons generally. The initial 
focus of the ICRC was on prisoners of war, who are not normally held in civilian prisons, which 
are primarily for untried or sentenced persons, but in special PoW camps. However, the ICRC 
explained in 2016: “The ICRC’s detention-related activities have progressively evolved from a 
monitoring role during armed conflicts to a broader range of activities that seek to help individuals 
deprived of their liberty in a variety of situations and places of detention.”30 The situations include 
not only instances, such as Guantanamo Bay, where the PoW status of the detainees is in dispute, 
but also instances where detainees held in relation to a non-international armed conflict or another 
situation of violence are often mixed with prisoners held for other reasons.31 In recent years the 
ICRC has begun to publish guidelines that can be applied in prisons of all kinds. These include 
specific guidance on water, sanitation, hygiene and habitat in 2012 and health care in 2017.32  This 
guidance is highly detailed and practical, going beyond that offered in the international standards, 
by dealing, for example, with architectural best practice in prison design.   
 Finally, it is now generally recognized that persons imprisoned by international tribunals 
and courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have to be held in conditions that meet 
the requirements of international law. This was not always the case: the regime governing the 
prison at Spandau holding prisoners sentenced by the International Military Tribunal that sat in 
                                                 
concerning communication No. 2226/2012 (Sep. 26, 2016); Samathanam v. Sri Lanka, 
CCPR/C/118/D/2412/2014, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, 
concerning communication No. 2412/2014 (Dec. 7, 2016); Suleimenov v. Kazakhstan, 
CCPR/C/119/D/2146/2012, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, 
concerning communication No. 2146/2012 (May. 12, 2017). 
29  No. 11: CV2694 (SAS), 2016 U.S Dist., (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016). CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012 ¶ 8.5; 
Suleimenov, CCPR/C/119/D/2146/2012 ¶ 8.7. 
30 INT’L COMM’N OF THE RED CROSS, PROTECTING PEOPLE DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY 5 (2016). 
31 Id.; see also Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 386 (2005). 
32 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WATER, SANITATION, HYGIENE AND HABITAT IN PRISONS (2012); INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HEALTH CARE IN DETENTION PRISONS (2017); see also INT’L COMM’N OF THE RED 
CROSS, TOWARDS HUMANE PRISONS, A PRINCIPLED AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO PRISON PLANNING AND 
DESIGN (2018). 
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Nuremburg was not clearly specified in law and varied according to which allied power was 
managing the prison in a particular month.33 However, when the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in the 1990s, one of its first judgments stipulated 
that all prisoners sentenced by it had to be treated in a way that met “principles of humanity and 
dignity which constitute the inspiration for the international standards governing the protection 
of the rights of convicted persons.”34 In this regard, it listed a range of international treaties and 
other instruments, which included both the ICCPR and the UNSMR.35 The ICC has adopted the 
same approach. The Statute governing the ICC provides directly that conditions in prisons where 
its sentences are enforced “shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards 
governing treatment of prisoners.”36 In practice, this also includes taking into account standards 
such as the UNSMR.37 Only a very small percentage of the world’s prisoners are detained as a 
result of the activities of international courts and tribunals, either in the detention centers attached 
to these bodies or in national prisons to which they send their convicts to serve their sentences. 
However, their impact on the emergence of a transnational prison ordering is significant. Such 
impact is not only symbolic. Where prisoners sentenced by an international court or tribunal are 
held in a national prison, the requirement that their treatment must meet international standards 
puts considerable pressure on the national prison system to conform to the same standards.38  
 
B. The emergence of regional legal standards on prison conditions  
 Regional standards on prison conditions emerged in much the same way as they did on 
the international level. Typically, a regional human rights treaty would recognize human dignity 
and prohibit, with minor variations of language, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. 
This would then be followed by specific instruments that spelled out for the region what prison 
conditions should be like and how prisoners should be treated. In the Americas, the key treaty is 
the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, applied to prisoners by the 2008 Principles and 
Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas.39 In Africa, the 
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights has been underpinned for prisoners by the 
                                                 
33 See NORMAN GODA, TALES FROM SPANDAU: NAZI CRIMINALS AND THE COLD WAR (2007). 
34 Prosecutor v. Erdomović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 74 (Nov. 29, 1996),  
35 Id. 
36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 106, July. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
37 van Zyl Smit, supra note 31, at 376. 
38 Id. For further analysis of these questions, see DENIS ABELS, PRISONERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
(2012); RÓISÍN MULGREW, TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL SYSTEM (2013). 
39 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Res. 1/08, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131, doc. 26 (Mar. 13, 2008). 
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1996 Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa,40 the 1999 Arusha Declaration on 
Good Prison Practice, 41  and the 2002 Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action on 
Accelerating Prisons and Penal Reforms in Africa.42   
 In Europe, this regional pattern emerged the earliest and has developed the furthest. It will 
therefore be treated as an example of the transnational legal order that can emerge from such 
regional standards. The initial treaty was the 1953 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). In 1973 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the European 
Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners (ESMR). These Rules were modeled on 
the 1955 UNSMR, but were designed also to emphasize a specifically European approach to prison 
conditions. In 1987 the ESMR were replaced by a more comprehensive set of rules, known simply 
as the European Prison Rules (EPR).  
 In 2006 the 1987 EPR were restructured comprehensively. The 2006 EPR reflected in 
considerable details an “expert” view of what minimum standards prison conditions should meet 
throughout Europe, one that has been endorsed by all member states of the Council of Europe, 
that is, all countries in geographic Europe except Belarus. In his powerful, analytical dissenting 
opinion in the 2016 decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Muršić v. Croatia, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque made much of these factors in arguing 
that the 2006 EPR had developed from soft law into the type of hard law that requires formal 
recognition by the ECtHR as a binding part of the overall European human rights framework.43 
Such recognition, granted, for example, to the minimum space requirements for prison cells 
spelled out in the EPRs, would mean that these requirements could be applied transnationally by 
the ECtHR, when deciding whether the accommodation for prisoners in a particular national 
prison was sufficiently spacious for it not to be inhuman or degrading.  
   
II. APPLICATION 
                                                 
40 Adopted by consensus in Sept. 1996 by 133 delegates from 47 countries, including 40 African countries, which 
met in Kampala, Uganda. The President of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ministers of 
State, Prison Commissioners, Judges and international, regional and national non-governmental organizations 
concerned with prison conditions took part in the meeting. Id. For further analysis see ABELS, supra note 39; 
MULGREW, supra note 39. 
41 Approved by the Prison Services in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (CESCA), held in Arusha, Tanzania 
from February 23, 1999 to February 27, 1999. 
42 Approved by the second Pan-African Conference on Prison and Penal Reform in Africa, held in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso from September 18, 2002 to September 20, 2002. 
43 Muršić v. Croatia, App. No. 7334/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 96–97 (2016) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J. dissenting); see 
also van Zyl Smit, supra note 27, at 279–80, for further reflections on the legitimacy of the EPR, including 
evidence of the specific application of the 2006 EPR by European states. 
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 International and regional interventions may have developed legal rules on prison 
conditions that have the status of transnational law, but for them to be part of a transnational legal 
order they must be applied across national boundaries. In practice, such cross-border application 
can operate in several interrelated ways, which are disaggregated in this part of the Paper. Key 
amongst these are (A) international and regional courts and tribunals, as well as (B) inspecting 
bodies of various kinds, whose legal writ runs across national boundaries. The significance of these 
key bodies is supplemented by (C) international professional associations and (D) international 
non-governmental organizations. Finally, this part considers (E) national application of the 
international and regional standards on prison conditions, as this is the decisive test of whether 
the ordering that these standards purport to do is in fact operative transnationally.      
 
A. Direct application by international and regional courts and tribunals 
 In discussion of the development of international and regional prison rules, we have 
already given some examples where international and regional courts and tribunals have upheld 
rules on prison conditions and found against nation states that did not conform to these rules. The 
contribution that these findings make towards establishing a transnational legal order is uneven.  
 At the European level, the ECtHR plays a significant role in applying standards that govern 
prison conditions. State parties to the ECHR undertake to enforce the judgments of the ECtHR 
and generally do so by improving the prison conditions of individual prisoners who can 
demonstrate that their treatment infringes the ECHR. The ECtHR can also award costs and 
damages to individual complainants, and these too are generally paid by the state parties against 
whom they are awarded. In addition, so-called pilot judgments are a further useful remedy, for 
they allow the Court to order a government to make systemic changes rather than merely to 
provide relief to an individual applicant. For example, where lack of space in a cell or poor medical 
services led to findings that prisoners in a particular state were persistently being treated in an 
inhuman or degrading way, the Court ordered the government of the state concerned to reduce 
prison overcrowding, so that all prisoners in the system had adequate space. Similarly, the Court 
has intervened to remedy shortcomings of the prison medical system as a whole, so that all 
prisoners had better health care.44  
 At the international level, the HRC has less power to issue binding judgments, even where 
states have acceded to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR that allows individuals to bring 
                                                 
44 Orchowski v. Poland, App. No. 17885/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Affaire Torreggiani et Autres c. Italie, Apps. 
Nos. 43517/09 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) (Fr.). 
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complaints, (called “communications”) against them.45 States that accede to the Optional Protocol 
undertake to provide the complainants with an effective remedy, including compensation, if 
required. They are also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.46 
In practice, however, these obligations are not always met. Thus, for example, in 2006 the HRC 
found that Australia had sentenced two juveniles to what was effectively a term of life 
imprisonment without parole (LWOP), which, the HRC concluded, created prison conditions that 
infringed the ICCPR.47 The Australian government, however, in what has been described as a 
“contemptuous response,” simply reiterated its view that the sentence allowed the complainants a 
reasonable possibility of being released and did not take any remedial action, either in respect of 
the complainants or by amending the law.48  
   
 
B. Application by regional and international inspectorates 
 A second indication that international rules on prison conditions are applied in a way that 
indicates that they are part of a transnational legal order is to be found in the activities of regional 
and international bodies, other than courts and tribunals, which attempt to enforce the application 
of standards governing prison conditions.  
 The European Committee on the Prevention of Torture (the CPT) is a regional example 
of such a body. It was established by a treaty, the 1987 European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1 of which provides that 
the CPT “shall, by means of visits, examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with 
a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Although the brief of the CPT extends beyond 
prisons, prison conditions are a key focus of its work. Today, all European states except Belarus 
are parties to the Convention and have a treaty-based duty to co-operate with the CPT.49 States 
                                                 
45 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 
171, 173. 
46 Id. art. 2. 
47 Blessington and Elliot v. Australia, HRC Communication No. 1968/2010, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/112/D/1968/2010, Nov. 17, 2014. 
48 Andrew Dyer, Irreducible Life Sentences: What Difference Have the European Convention on Human Rights 
& the United Kingdom Human Rights Act Made? 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 541, 584 (2016); Response of Australia 
to the Views of the Human Rights Committee in Communication No. 1968/2010 (Blessington and Elliot v 
Australia), 
https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsandProtections/HumanRights/Documents/Blessington&ElliotVAustralia-
AustralianGovernmentResponse.pdf (last accessed Oct. 1, 2018). 
49 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 
3, Nov. 26, 1987, CETS 126. 
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parties must help the CPT to perform its tasks, by granting access to all places of detention and 
providing all relevant information. In addition, they must respond to the CPT country visit reports 
within six months, and in a final response after one year must set out how they will take into 
account its recommendations.50  
 The reports on the visits are confidential but can be published at the request or with the 
consent of the country concerned. If a state does not co-operate with the CPT or systematically 
does not follow its recommendations, the CPT may publish a statement about its key findings and 
recommendations without the consent of the state concerned. As a result, most countries consent 
to publication of the full CPT reports, which are published together with the responses of the 
member states.51 This publicity is a powerful incentive for them to change their practices. Evidence 
of the practical effect of CPT interventions on prison conditions at the national level has increased 
in recent years, and scholarly research shows that several states do make some efforts to conform 
with recommendations of the CPT.52 At the regional level the CPT has played a further role by 
inspecting the detention facility in the Netherlands where prisoners on trial before the ICTY are 
housed as well as prisons in other European countries that hold prisoners sentenced by the 
Tribunal.53    
 At the international level there is an interesting variation on the CPT’s methods of work. 
The explicit objective of the 2006 Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) is to 
“establish a system of regular visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies to 
places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”54  
                                                 
50 Id. art 8. 
51 ANTONIO CASSESE, INHUMAN STATES: IMPRISONMENT, DETENTION AND TORTURE IN EUROPE TODAY (1996). 
52 For example, the Netherlands. Jan de Lange, Detentie genormeerd: Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van het 
CPT voor de inrichting van vrijheidsbeneming, in NEDERLANDSE PENITENTIAIRE INRICHTINGEN (2008) (Neth.); 
Germany: DANIELA CERNKO, DIE IMPLEMENTIERUNG DER CPT-EMPFEHLUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFVOLLZUG, 
(2014) (Ger.); Also, the Nordic countries. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä & Lauri Koskenniemi, National & Regional 
Instruments in Securing the Rule of Law & Human Rights in the Nordic Prisons, 70 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 
135, 159 (2018).  
Greece is an exception. Sappho Xenakis & Leonidas Chelioliotis, International pressure and carceral 
moderation: Greece and the European Convention on Human Rights, in MONITORING PENAL POLICY IN EUROPE 
92 (Cliquennois & de Suremain eds., 1st ed. 2017) (commenting that “Greek governments have long responded 
to critical CPT reports with a combination of denial and defiance”. The same may be said of Russia, which has 
been the subject of number of highly critical public statements by the CPT). 
53 Sonja Snacken & Nik Kiefer, Oversight ofIinternational Imprisonment:Tthe Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL SYSTEM 322, 344 (Róisín Mulgrew & Denis 
Abels eds., 2016). 
54 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 18, 2002, at the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by 
resolution A/RES/57/199 [hereinafter OPCAT]. 
Formatted: German (Germany)
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 For this purpose, OPCAT requires the creation of two types of bodies. First, there is the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), an international body that undertakes visits.55 The 
SPT conducts its visits in much the same way the CPT does,56 and since 2007 has undertaken a 
number of visits worldwide. 
 Secondly, national states that accede to OPCAT have to set up National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), which must have “functional independence”,57 access to information, and 
wide powers of investigation58 in respect of all persons deprived of their liberty. OPCAT also 
provides that NPMs may publish their findings. 59  In terms of OPCAT, national authorities 
undertake to enter into a dialogue with the NPMs about the implementation of any 
recommendations they may make.60 Working with NPMs is a major function of the SPT.61 Much 
of the SPT’s energy is focused on strengthening NPMs rather than on only undertaking 
investigations itself. States parties have considerable flexibility on how they constitute their NPMs 
and many of them seek to rely on their existing prison monitoring systems as key elements of their 
NPMs.62 Nevertheless, OPCAT, through the SPT, has had an impact on the development of 
national monitoring bodies to ensure that they meet the commitments that states parties have 
entered into. The substance of these commitments includes the implementation of the UNSMR 
and other international instruments that refer to prison conditions.  
 The ratification of OPCAT and the establishment of NPMs has been a slow process. 
Currently there are eighty-eight states parties of whom sixty-seven have designated their NPMs.63 
A 2016 report by the Association of the Prevention of Torture, an international NGO that has 
sought to propagate OPCAT, points to a direct impact of NPMs on prison conditions in several 
countries.64 These range widely, with reports of positive changes in Costa Rica, Indonesia, Georgia, 
Mali and Morocco.  
 A more critical literature, which points out that NPMs are not a panacea to all problems 
of imprisonment, is gradually emerging.65 The powers and influence of NPMs vary from country 
                                                 
55 Id. arts. 5–8. 
56 Id. art. 11(a).  
57 Id. art. 18. 
58 Id. art. 19. 
59 Id. art. 23. 
60 Id. art. 20 
61 Id. art. 11(b). 
62 Slovenia spelt this out in its reservation to its ratification of OPCAT. 
63 OPCAT Database, Association for the Prevention of Torture, https://apt.ch/en/opcat-database/ (last visited Aug. 
29, 2018). 
64 Association for the Prevention of Torture, Putting prevention into practice 10 years on: the Optional Protocol 
to the UN Convention against Torture (2016). 
65 Judy McGregor, The challenges & limitations of OPCAT national preventive mechanisms: lessons from New 
Zealand 23 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 351, 367 (2017); Elina Steinerte, The Jewel in the Crown and Its Three 
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to country. Moreover, some key countries, including the US, have not ratified OPCAT at all.66 
However, OPCAT remains important as a potentially worldwide mechanism that is concerned 
with improving the detail of prison conditions.   
 Finally, there are various other international processes that also contribute to monitoring 
prisons and thus have some impact on the recognition of prison conditions as something of more 
than local significance. A whole range of UN committees, including the Human Rights 
Committee, 67  the Committee against Torture, 68  the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 69 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,70 and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women,71 all receive reports from States Parties on whether they are 
meeting the standards set by the underlying treaties. In as far as these treaties are relevant to the 
treatment of prisoners, these reports regularly include accounts of prison conditions. The 
evaluations of these reports by the relevant committees produce further international 
understandings of what prison conditions should be like. Similarly, the reports of UN special 
rapporteurs, particularly the Special Rapporteur on Torture, often contain both information on 
abusive prison conditions and recommendations on what should be done to combat them.72 
Inspections by the ICRC play largely the same role, although ICRC reports are usually confidential 
to the government concerned.73  
 
C. Professional associations 
 Professional associations play an important part in encouraging the implementation of 
regional and international prison standards. In Europe, the Penological Council of the Council of 
Europe organizes Annual Conferences for Directors of Prison and Probation Services at which 
                                                 
Guardians: Independence of National Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the UN Torture 
Convention, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2014). 
66 For an argument supporting the ratification of OPCAT by the U.S.A., see Jonathan Simon, Penal monitoring 
in the United States: lessons from the American experience and prospects for change, 70 CRIME L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 161, 173 (2018). 
67 Established by [the] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 28, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S 
171. 
68 Established by [the] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, art. 17, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
69 Established by [the] Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 43, Nov 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
70 Established by [the] Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 34, Jan. 24, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
71 Established by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 17, Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13. 
72 For the introduction of prison conditions to the remit of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, see NIGEL S. RODLEY WITH MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT 
OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 400–01 (3rd ed. 2009); for the nature & function of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture more broadly, see id. at 204. 
73 Id. at 198. 
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European prison standards are given considerable prominence.74 The secretariat of the Penological 
Council has backed this up with a survey of what European states have done to implement the 
EPR, which it has shared with heads of prison services.75 In addition, the European Union (EU) 
has supported the establishment of EuroPris, the umbrella organization of prison services 
throughout Europe, which represents the interests of prison administrations and prison officers 
before the various European bodies in the EU and the Council of Europe. EuroPris describes its 
primary function as “bringing together practitioners in the prisons’ arena with the specific 
intention of promoting ethical and rights-based imprisonment, exchanging information and 
providing expert assistance to support this agenda.”76   
In other regions, there are similar organizations. In Africa for example, the African 
Correctional Services Association represents the interests of correctional professionals and at the 
same time places emphasis on the recognition of the rights that prisoners have to humane prison 
conditions.77     
At the international level, the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) 
has developed into the leading professional organization for prison officers worldwide. The stated 
mission of the ICPA is “to promote and share ethical and effective correctional practices to 
                                                 
74 E.g., Jan Kleijssen, opening speech at the 23rd Council of Europe Conference of Directors of Prison and 
Probation Services, Working Together Effectively: Management and Co-operation Models between Prison and 
Probation Services (June 19, 2018), Jõhvi, Estonia discussing ECtHR judgments and CPT reports relating to 
prison overcrowding, https://rm.coe.int/jan-kleijssen-opening-speech-23rd-cdpps-estonia-2018-doc/16808b7dfe 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2018);  
Torbjørn Frøysnes, Ambassador, Head of the Council of Europe Office to the EU, Opening speech at the 18th 
Conference of Directors of Prison Administration Brussels (Nov. 22, 2013) (outlining importance of ECtHR case 
law and pilot judgments [¶ 5] and emphasising the aim of improving implementation of CoE standards and ECtHR 
judgments [¶ 6]),  
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806f50
88 (last visited Oct. 9, 2018); 
Pedro das Neves, Policy and Program Advisor, Prison Administration, Portugal, Presenter to the 18th Conference 
of Directors of Prison Administration Brussels: The “Low Cost” prison: minimum design for minimum results 
(Nov. 27, 2018) 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806f4f
c2 (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (discussing overcrowding and the importance of CPT and EPR standards). 
75 Council of Europe Report presented to the 16th Conference of Directors of Prison Administration: Summary 
of the replies given to the questionnaire regarding the implementation of the most recent Council of Europe 
standards related to the treatment of offenders while in custody as well as in the community (Council of Europe 
2011). 
76 European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services, https://www.europris.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 
9, 2018).  
77  African Correctional Services Association, http://acsa-ps.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (“The 
Association aims to become the front runner and nucleus of Correctional professional development on the African 
continent and one of the leading Correctional development [organizations] in the world.”) The 4th ACSA Biennial 
Conference held in Kigali, Rwanda included a presentation from Penal Reform titled Implementation of the Nelson 
Mandela Rules in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities May 16, 2017; conference program available at 
http://acsa-ps.org/4th%20conference%20program%20Day2.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
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enhance public safety and healthier communities world-wide.”78 Much of its work aims to improve 
technical aspects of prison administration.  However, it has involved itself in developing regional 
and national prison standards79 and in propagating the Nelson Mandela Rules.80   
 
D. Application by international non-governmental organizations 
Specialist international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) rely heavily on 
international prison standards to justify and legitimatize their initiatives to improve prison 
conditions.  Prominent amongst these is Penal Reform International, which specifically refers to 
the Bangkok Rules when seeking the reform of prison conditions for women in the Middle East 
and North Africa region.81 Penal Reform International also mentions the Nelson Mandela Rules 
more generally when campaigning for reforms ranging from a worldwide limit on the use of 
solitary confinement to the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners. 82  The Association for the 
Prevention of Torture campaigns for the ratification of OPCAT and trains bodies acting as 
National Preventive Mechanisms in international human rights standards.83 Human Rights Watch, 
which regularly produces reports on prison conditions in various countries, refers to UN standards 
when justifying its recommendations for improving these conditions.84 Amnesty International, 
too, makes use of these instruments. For example, a recent report by Amnesty International, 
Punished for Being Poor: Unjustified, Excessive and Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention in Madagascar, relied heavily 
                                                 
78 International Corrections & Prisons Association, Mission, Vision and Values https://icpa.ca/about-us/mission-
vision-and-values/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).  
79 The introductory text of the ICPA states: “The ICPA has collaborated and formed agreements with partner 
[organizations] for standards-setting in both Africa (the Abuja Declaration) and in Latin America (the Barbados 
Declaration), and has pledged to work together with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping in a 
concerted manner to address the many challenges facing prison systems, particularly in developing and post-
conflict environments (the UNDPKO Declaration).” Int’l Corrections & Prisons Ass’n, About Us, 
https://icpa.ca/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
80 See e.g., https://www.irishprisons.ie/director-general-michael-donnellan-awarded-head-service-award-icpa-
conference-london-25th-october-2017/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
81  PENAL REFORM INT’L, IMPACT EVALUATION: PROMOTING A HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TOWARDS 
DETENTION IN MENA (2011-2013) ( 2015). 
82 OLIVIA ROPE & FRANCES SHEAHAN, PENAL REFORM INT’L & THAILAND INST. OF JUSTICE, GLOBAL PRISON 
TRENDS 2018 (2018) (life sentence conditions at 13, solitary confinement at 27).  
83 Association for the Prevention of Torture Annual Report 2017: 40 years of torture prevention (APT 2017). 
84 Human Rights Watch Reports: We Are In Tombs: Abuses in Egypt’s Scorpion Prison (HRW Sept. 2016); We 
Are Like The Dead: Torture and other Human Rights Abuses in Jail Ogaden, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia 
(HRW July 2018); I Needed Help, Instead I Was Punished: Abuse and Neglect of Prisoners with Disabilities in 
Australia (HRW Feb. 2018); Double Punishment: Inadequate Conditions for Prisoners with Psychosocial 
Disabilities in France (HRW Apr. 2016). 
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on the Bangkok Rules and the Nelson Mandela Rules in its call for action to set right prison 
conditions that amount to serious human rights abuses.85 
E. National applications 
In Europe, there is evidence that initiatives taken at the European level to improve prison 
conditions have been reflected in changed national practices. Recent research findings have shown 
that, while some European states resist supervision of their prison systems by the ECtHR or claim 
that for economic reasons they are unable to implement them, the Court’s judgments have had a 
systematic impact on how prisoners are treated throughout Europe.86   In 2011 the Penological 
Council of the Council of Europe conducted a survey of what European states have done to 
implement the 2006 EPR.87 Of the thirty-four states that replied, only the UK answered that the 
EPR had had no impact on its prison legislation or practices.  
Evidence of the practical effect of CPT interventions on prison conditions at the national 
level has also increased in recent years. Scholarly research shows that several states do make 
concerted efforts to conform to the recommendations of the CPT.88  
A good example of how these various European developments could combine to have 
practical impact on prison conditions occurred in 2004 when a Scottish prisoner sued the 
authorities on the grounds that his human rights had been breached by his suffering from severe 
eczema because of the conditions in which he had been forced to live. A Scottish court found that 
the conditions under which the prisoner had been held, including the practice of “slopping out”, 
that is using a bucket that had to be emptied in the morning as a lavatory during the night, 
                                                 
85 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PUNISHED FOR BEING POOR: UNJUSTIFIED, EXCESSIVE AND PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL 
DETENTION IN MADAGASCAR (2018).  
86  See MONITORING PENAL POLICY IN EUROPE (Gaëtan Cliquennois & Hugues de Suremain eds., 2018) 
(introducing the accounts of the role of the ECtHR in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, the Nordic 
countries, England and Wales, and Spain). 
87 Council of Europe Report presented to the 16th Conference of Directors of Prison Administration: Summary 
of the replies given to the questionnaire regarding the implementation of the most recent Council of Europe 
standards related to the treatment of offenders while in custody as well as in the community (Council of Europe 
2011). 
88 For example, the Netherlands. JAN DE LANGE, DETENTIE GENORMEERD: EEN ONDERZOEK NAAR DE BETEKENIS 
VAN HET CPT VOOR DE INRICHTING VAN VRIJHEIDSBENEMING IN NEDERLANDSE PENITENTIAIRE INRICHTINGEN 
(Wolf 2008) (Neth.); Germany: DANIELA CERNKO, DIE IMPLEMENTIERUNG DER CPT-EMPFEHLUNGEN IM 
DEUTSCHEN STRAFVOLLZUG, (2014) (Ger.); and the Nordic countries: Tapio Lappi-Seppälä & Lauri Koskenniemi, 
National & Regional Instruments in Securing the Rule of Law & Human Rights in the Nordic Prisons, 70 CRIME 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 159 (2018).  
Greece is an exception. Sappho Xenakis & Leonidas Chelioliotis, International Pressure and Carceral 
Moderation: Greece and the European Convention on Human Rights, in MONITORING PENAL POLICY IN EUROPE 
92 (Cliquennois & de Suremain eds., 1st ed. 2017) (“Greek governments have long responded to critical CPT 
reports with a combination of denial and defiance.”). The same may be said of Russia, which has been the subject 
of number of highly critical public statements by the CPT. 
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constituted a breach of his right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment.89 In coming 
to this conclusion, the Scottish court referred to both to judgments of the ECtHR and the EPR. 
In addition, it placed considerable weight on the reports of the CPT that had condemned the 
practice of slopping out and noted the failure of the Scottish executive to abide by earlier 
government undertakings to rectify the problem.  The practical effect on prison conditions was 
that the Scottish authorities abolished the practice of slopping out throughout the Scottish prison 
system, by building extra facilities that give all prisoners direct access to lavatories.90 
International prison standards were initially paid relatively little attention by national 
courts.91 However, the revised Nelson Mandela Rules were relied on shortly after their adoption 
in some path breaking national decisions on the controversial subject of solitary confinement. For 
example, in 2016, this happened in the Federal District Court in New York where Judge Shira 
Schneidlin justified a consent decree drastically reducing the use of solitary confinement with 
reference to Rule 45 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, which provides that “solitary confinement shall 
be used only in exceptional cases, for a last resort, and subject to independent review.”92 An even 
more specific example arose in Canada in early 2018, where a judge of the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia relied heavily on the Nelson Mandela Rules to define administrative segregation 
as solitary confinement and to prohibit it when used continuingly for longer than fifteen days—
the maximum period that the Rules allow for solitary confinement.93 These decisions are an 
indication that international standards on prison conditions may play an increasing role in the 
future.   
In sum, when application of standards to prison conditions is considered in the round, 
there is overwhelming evidence of the development and reinforcement of  these standards at the 
international, regional and national levels. It is at the national level, however, that their actual 
application takes place. 
 
III. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE  
                                                 
89 Napier v. Scottish Ministers, [2004] SLT 555, [2004] UKHRR 881.   
90 Sarah Armstrong, Securing Prison through Human Rights: Unanticipated Implications of Rights‐Based Penal 
Governance, 57 HOWARD J. CRIME & JUSTICE 401, 421 (2018). 
91  Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Impact of United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Standards on 
Domestic Legislation and Criminal Justice Operation, in THE APPLICATION OF UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS AND 
NORMS IN CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 133, 140 (U.N. Off. in Drugs and Crime ed., 2003). 
92 People v. Annucci No. 1:2011cv02694 - Document 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). No. 11:CV2694(SAS), 2016 U.S 
Dist., (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).  
93 B.C Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), (2018) CanLII 62 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
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 Mutual assistance in criminal matters is widely recognized as an element of transnational 
criminal law.94 The extradition of suspects from one state to stand trial in another state has long 
been accepted as a key element of mutual assistance. Similarly important is the transfer of 
sentenced prisoners from the state where they committed their offenses to the states of which they 
are nationals so that they can serve their sentences in their “home” countries.  
 Making such assistance dependent on the prison conditions to which the person to be 
extradited or transferred will be subject in the receiving state, is a much more recent development. 
This issue first came to international attention in 1989 in the case of Jens Soering, whose 
extradition from the UK to the US was challenged before the ECtHR on the basis that it would 
infringe his human rights as he would face the death penalty in the US. The ECtHR agreed, not 
because it regarded the death penalty as inherently contrary to the ECHR, but because the long 
period of detention on death row to which Soering might be subject would be inhuman and 
degrading. Such treatment would infringe the prohibition of such treatment in Article 3 of the 
ECHR.95 Therefore, Soering could not be extradited to the US if there was a possibility that he 
would be sentenced to death. The US responded to this decision by giving a guarantee that Soering 
would not face the death sentence and, on this basis, the British government allowed his 
extradition. Subsequently, such guarantees have routinely been given in all cases where extradition 
is sought from abolitionist countries. The Soering judgment, however, was of international 
significance beyond the question of the death penalty. It raised the wider question of whether the 
possibility that persons sent abroad against their will would potentially face human rights violations 
in prison, could also be a ground for refusing extradition. 
 National courts were initially hostile to considering these wider implications and sought to 
relativize the human rights standards relating to prison conditions by arguing that strict national 
and regional standards should not be applied when someone was to be sent outside the region. In 
2008 the House of Lords (then still the apex court in the United Kingdom) specifically declined 
to apply an absolute standard in cases where someone would face life imprisonment outside 
Europe. 96  An absolute standard would mean, Lord Hoffmann suggested sarcastically, that a 
suspect could not be extradited to a country where prisons did not have flush lavatories, since it 
had been held in the UK that a failure to provide such facilities for domestic prisoners was 
inhuman and degrading.97 
                                                 
94 NEIL BOISTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2018). 
95 Soering v. The United Kingdom, App.14038/88, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1989). 
96 Regina (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] UKHL 72, [2009] 1 AC 335 (HL) 
(Eng.). 
97 Id. ¶ 27.   
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 Even the German Federal Constitutional Court equivocated on whether prisoners should 
have the same human rights following extradition as they would in the country in which they had 
initially been arrested. In 2005, it allowed the extradition from Germany to California of two 
murder suspects where they would face LWOP sentences. In Germany, such a sentence would be 
regarded as contrary to the constitutional right to human dignity, because imprisonment without 
a clear procedure for considering release after a fixed period is regarded as denying the 
fundamental humanity of the prisoner concerned. However, in an extradition case that was 
important for purposes of mutual assistance, the German Court explained, a less strict standard 
could be applied.98 
 Nevertheless, in 2010, in a case involving a request from Turkey for the extradition of 
someone who, on conviction, would also face an LWOP sentence, the Federal Constitutional 
Court changed its position. It found that, notwithstanding the requirement of international law 
that foreign legal orders were to be respected, if someone had no practical prospect of release such 
punishment would be cruel and degrading (grausam und erniedrigend).99   
 European human rights law has developed in the same way as that in Germany. Since the 
beginning of the current decade the ECtHR has repeatedly recognized in principle that suspects 
facing extradition should have their human rights as prisoners - both to the internal conditions of 
imprisonment that meet human rights standards and, in the case of persons facing a life sentence, 
to appropriate consideration for release - recognized before extradition would be allowed. In 
principle therefore, the ECHR standards are absolute, to be applied whenever a European state 
wishes to send someone abroad to be incarcerated there.  
 The difficulty for persons facing extradition has been to prove that in practice their 
imprisonment abroad would not meet these human rights criteria. There are a few examples where 
extradition has been resisted successfully on the grounds of the treatment that they may face if 
they were to be imprisoned in the country seeking their extradition. In the important 2015 case of 
Trabelsi v Belgium the ECtHR did find that the highly restrictive prospects of release that Trabelsi, 
who was wanted for terrorism in the US, would face if he were convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment, would be inhuman and degrading, and that his extradition should be prohibited.100 
                                                 
98  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 6, 2005, 113 Entscheidungen des  
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 154 (Ger.). 
99 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 2010. (Ger.).   
100 Trabelsi v. Belgium, App. No. 140/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20, 41 (2014). 
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(Even this was something of a Pyrrhic victory as Belgium sent Trabelsi back to the US before the 
ECtHR could give its judgment.101)  
 In most extradition cases, however, allegations that prison conditions would be so bad that 
prisoners would inevitably be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment have rarely succeeded. 
For example, in 2012 in Babar Ahmed and others v the United Kingdom, the applicants argued that their 
detention in the supermax prison, ADX Florence, where they might well be held in solitary 
confinement following their extradition to the US, would be a form of inhuman and degrading 
treatment that would contravene Article 3 of the ECHR. In spite of being able to present 
considerable evidence of the shortcomings of the regime at ADX Florence, Babar Ahmed and his 
fellow applicants were unable to convince the ECtHR that the ill-treatment that they could suffer 
there was likely to reach the requisite level of severity that would justify a finding that Article 3 of 
the ECHR would be contravened.102 
 Within the European Union (EU), mutual assistance has developed a more streamlined 
alternative to the cumbersome procedures of worldwide extradition. Member states of the EU 
have made provision for a European Arrest Warrant, which entitles an EU member state to issue 
a warrant requesting that a person be sent to them from another member state to attend trial or 
serve a sentence of imprisonment. 103  If certain formal requirements relating primarily to the 
seriousness of the offense and the nationality of the person whose arrest is sought are met, such 
warrant must be implemented more or less automatically by the executing state, without an enquiry 
into the substantive grounds for the request that is necessary before traditional extradition could 
be allowed. A further EU instrument makes provision for executing member states to send 
sentenced prisoners without their consent to serve their sentences in the countries of which they 
are nationals.104 Again, if certain formal requirements are met, this may happen also without the 
consent of the state to which the prisoners are to be returned.  
 The (unintended?) result of these tighter regulations has been that one of the few grounds 
on which a cross-border transfer of prisoners can be challenged is that prison conditions in the 
issuing state, where they will be held, as either awaiting trial or sentenced prisoners, do not meet 
                                                 
101 Mark Eeckhaut & Jan Temmerman, Nizar Trabelsi uitgeleverd aan de VS, DE STANDAARD (Belg.) (Oct. 3, 
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procedures between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L190) 1.  
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human rights standards. This is paradoxical, for the assumption of these EU instruments, as the 
Luxembourg-based Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently again 
emphasized, is that there is a strong presumption that all member states comply with the 
fundamental rights recognized by the EU as a whole.105 However, in exceptional circumstances, 
the CJEU has held there may be a departure from the principle of mutual assistance based on 
mutual trust. As the CJEU has explained: 
 
where the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in possession of 
evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained 
in the issuing Member State, having regard to the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the 
Charter, that judicial authority is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it 
is called upon to decide on the surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member 
State of the individual sought by a European arrest warrant. The consequence of 
the execution of such a warrant must not be that that individual suffers inhuman or 
degrading treatment.106  
 
This principle is a vivid example of how the transnational recognition of standards for 
prison conditions can influence decisively how a key “moving part” of the transnational legal order 
operates, or even whether it operates at all. If prison conditions in the executing state are found 
not to meet human rights standards, the issuing state is not able to have its warrants enforced.     
 A further interesting question is, how should an executing state decide whether there is a 
risk that a particular prisoner who is to be transferred might suffer inhuman or degrading 
treatment? In two important cases, both involving a request following from a European arrest 
warrant to transfer a prisoner from Germany to Hungary, the CJEU has given some important 
guidance in this regard. The process has two steps. First, the court in the executing state must, in 
the words of the CJEU,  
 
initially, rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated 
on the detention conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State and that 
demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or 
which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of 
detention. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of 
international courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the 
issuing Member State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced 
by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the UN.107          
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 This technique itself is of significance for the recognition of the transnational aspect of the 
law governing prison conditions, as the sources mentioned here are also the sources of information 
on which, as we have seen, transnational insights into prison conditions rely. In this particular case, 
much was made by the CJEU of a decision of the ECtHR that had held that prisons in the 
Hungarian system as a whole were overcrowded.108 This was coupled to other key decisions of the 
ECtHR that overcrowding resulted in conditions that infringed the prohibition on inhuman and 
degrading treatment.109 The fact that the CJEU also allows consideration of other documents 
produced by the Council of Europe opens the way for courts to consider CPT reports on 
conditions in the requesting state, while the reference to UN reports would allow reports by, for 
example, a special rapporteur to be considered in appropriate cases.   
 If the court in the executing state considers that it is in possession of information that 
shows that there are systemic or generalized deficiencies in detention conditions in the receiving 
state, the second step commences. The court in the executing state must determine whether the 
particular individual who is the subject of an EAW is likely to be detained in a prison where he or 
she is likely to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Guidance issued by the CJEU in 
a recent judgment suggests that in such a case the court in the executing state must also rely on 
official material from international and regional sources, and cannot rely only on the undertakings 
given by the issuing state.110 The executing judicial authorities are still bound to undertake an 
individual assessment of the situation of each person concerned, in order to satisfy themselves that 
their decision on the surrender of that person will not expose him or her, on account of those 
conditions, to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 Finally, with regard to mutual assistance more generally, insistence on international 
standards may result in states that wish to transfer prisoners out of their territory seeking to 
intervene in the prison systems of foreign states to ensure that the conditions in their prisons are 
human rights compliant.111 A striking example of this tendency is to be found in interactions 
between the UK and Nigeria in this respect. In 2014, the British government concluded an 
agreement with Nigeria, which allows the UK to return Nigerian nationals who are serving prison 
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sentences in the UK to Nigeria to serve the remainder of their sentences.112 Contrary to what had 
been the general practice in international agreements outside Europe up to this point, the 
agreement provides that such prisoners may be returned without their consent. The British 
government, fearing, not without reason, that prisoners, facing being sent to Nigeria against their 
will, would object on the grounds that Nigerian prison conditions would infringe their human 
rights, provided the Nigerian government with a significant amount of aid money that would 
enable the Nigerians to build and run human-rights-compliant prisons where returning prisoners 
could be housed.  In March 2018 the Foreign Secretary informed Parliament that the British 
Government had agreed to build a “UN compliant” 112-bed wing in Kiri Kiri Prison, in Lagos in 
Nigeria, at a cost of almost £700,000.113 The small phrase, “UN compliant,” is a further indicator 
of the extent to which international standards, such as the Nelson Mandela Rules, which the UN 
has been propagating vigorously, have become an accepted part of this transnational process.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The transnational ordering of prison conditions has a long history. Ideas about how all 
prisons should be managed have been formulated over more than the last two centuries. That 
international and regional standards should embody these ideas is largely a product of the emphasis 
on human rights in the post–World War II period.  
As this Paper has demonstrated, the mechanisms for articulating and enforcing these 
standards have continued to develop at the international and regional levels, thus enabling the 
ordering of this area of law and practice. Since the earliest times the ordering process has been 
driven by a mixture of theorists and practitioners. In more recent times, these theorists have tended 
to be academics and judges inspired by rights-driven ideals of human dignity. The human rights 
discourse has contributed to the legitimacy of the ordering process. However, its success has 
always depended on engaging with prison officials who have the immediate power to improve 
prison conditions. This engagement has been deliberately sought, with varying degrees of success, 
in different parts of the world.      
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 More research is required to show the impact the discourse about prisoners’ rights on 
prison conditions in individual countries, particularly in the developing world.114  There can be 
little doubt, however, that an element of transnational legal ordering of prison conditions is a factor 
in all modern prison systems.     
 In many ways, the growing attention paid to the international and regional standards 
governing prison conditions is a positive aspect of the transnational legal ordering of 
imprisonment. The 2015 Nelson Mandela Rules and 2006 European Prison Rules exemplify this 
renewed emphasis. Among the benefits of rules of this kind are the additional rights and legal 
protections offered to prisoners worldwide.  
 At the same time, the existence of common standards underpins transnational co-
operation in prosecuting crime and enforcing sentences of imprisonment. The mutual recognition 
of common standards facilitates the extradition of accused persons and sentenced prisoners 
between states that apply these standards in their prisons. It also has the potential to give states 
that are responding to requests for extradition, or the transfer of sentenced prisoners, leverage to 
demand the improvement of prison conditions in the receiving states where the prisons may not 
be up to standard.  
 The overall impact of human rights-based standards on actual prison conditions has been 
subject of much debate. One position is out-and-out skepticism about whether they have any 
impact at all. This is relatively easy to dismiss, as we have seen, for there is empirical evidence of 
specific changes for the better in prison conditions flowing directly from such interventions. At 
very least, there is some impact on national law and practice in respect of prison conditions some 
of the time. 
A variation on out-and-out skepticism would hold that human rights interventions in the 
form of international standards may be of very limited direct significance in their own right, but 
that they provide stimulus to NGOs, who can use them to legitimize their own interventionist 
strategies.115 As we have seen, there is certainly convincing evidence of INGOs in particular being 
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empowered by the legitimacy of regional and international instruments that set standards in 
relation to prison conditions. 
 Finally, there is a more sophisticated argument that recognizes that a human rights 
approach to prisoners’ rights may lead to bureaucratic reforms, that is, to increase legal ordering 
of prison services. However, the unintended consequence may be not only to increase the 
legitimacy of human rights-compliant prison services but also to provide them with more 
resources, for example, to build new (and larger) facilities in order to fulfill a mandate of providing 
better prison conditions. For example, it has been argued that abolition of “slopping out in 
Scotland led to resources being made available to expand the prison system as a whole.”116  
The risk is that transnational legal ordering of prison conditions will pay lip service to 
having acceptable conditions worldwide, but will contribute to a growth in imprisonment. For 
example, it may be argued that prisoners will be rehabilitated more effectively if they are returned 
to their countries of origin, but the real motivation may be that wealthier states are keen to facilitate 
such transfers in order to rid themselves of troublesome offenders. Even allowing for the cost of 
improving prisons abroad, it is often cheaper to have prisoners serving their sentences there than 
in the countries that seek to send them. The paradoxical effect may be that a focus on improving 
prison conditions in developing countries may lead to foreign aid being directed to building prisons 
that will house expelled prisoners rather than to development programs that will benefit those 
countries more directly.  
The recognition of paradoxes of this kind illustrates the utility of seeing human rights-
driven reforms through the critical lens of transnational legal ordering, as it considers law and 
practice at the same time. It also illustrates how carefully analyzing prisons conditions as a product 
of transnational legal ordering can provide insights that go beyond claims that setting international 
standards for prison conditions is necessarily desirable, while at the same time not denying the 
positive impact such standards may have.  
Transnational legal orders are inherently complex. Their functions may include both 
progressive and repressive elements. This conclusion may disappoint human rights idealists, who 
are determined to improve prison conditions by developing international standards against which 
these conditions can be judged. As this Paper has shown, however, a focus on transnational legal 
ordering reveals many of these complexities. This is a strength of this form of analysis, which may 
assist in developing more effective reformist strategies as well.   
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